In order to analyse the impact of policy reforms on the performance of the banking sector in Iran we present a decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen Total Factor Productivity (TFP). This entails a comparison of both the intermediate and operating performances of different types of banks in the pre-and post-reform eras. Our results show that under the intermediation approach, state-owned banks (public banks) were considerably more efficient than private banks in the post-regulation period. In contrast, under the operating approach, private banks were fully technically efficient and mix efficient in both pre and post-reform eras. This paper highlights the importance of analysing performance from multiple perspectives. The findings reflect public banks' mission to maximise loans to target groups while private banks are motivated more by financial profit. 
Introduction
In order to obtain a comprehensive assessment of the performance of any banking system, it is crucial to examine the productivity of individual banks considering both the intermediation and operating approaches. The former examines banks' loan making ability while the latter focuses on income and revenue generation. However, all previous studies of efficiency and productivity changes in the Iranian banking sector have analysed the results of the intermediation approach only (Hadian and Hosseini, 2004; Hakimabady et al., 2006; Hasanzadeh, 2007; Dadgar and Nemat, 2007; Arjomandi et al. 2012) . The intermediation approach analyses how efficiently banks transform deposits from savers into loans of varying maturities for borrowers. Given the importance of the this role, previous studies have considered the value of loans as a measurable output and the magnitude of deposits along with labour and capital as three major inputs. Using a similar classification of input and output variables Arjomandi et al. (2012) found that the banking industry's technical efficiency deteriorated considerably soon after the regulatory changes in 2005, and the overall productivity performance also exhibited a similar outcome over the period [2007] [2008] . Arjomandi et al. (2012, p.295) stated that the overall reduction of efficiency "was mainly attributable to the performance of private banks which became technically inefficient (the worst bank-group) and more scale and mix inefficient over this period, particularly in 2008". Arjomandi et al. (2012, p.295) have also argued that "lower technical efficiency of private banks over this period can be attributed to their poor management of increasing deposits".
However, merely focusing on the intermediation services and excluding the revenue side of the banking system is likely to provide an incomplete picture of productivity changes. This is particularly relevant when we compare public banks to private banks. It is important to note that the private banks' major goal is to maximise income and profits, whereas the public banks in countries like Iran have to follow the government's regulations and provide services to specific groups. Thus, it is of paramount importance to compare and contrast the performance of the Iranian private and public banks using the results of productivity and efficiency changes from both the intermediating and operating views. On this same issue, Berger and Mester (2003, p.80) state that the use of the profit-oriented (operating) approach "may help take into account unmeasured changes in the quality of banking services by including higher revenues paid for the improved quality, and may help capture the profit maximisation goal by including both the costs and revenues". The operating approach defines banks' output as total revenue (interest and noninterest income) and considers interest and non-interest expenses as inputs.
The major contributions of this study are thus two-fold. First, by comparing and contrasting the results of the intermediation approach (Arjomandi et al., 2012) with the new results obtained from the operating approach, we will be able to provide a better assessment of both private and public banks in Iran pursuing different goals. Second, this study is the first attempt to use the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index to compare the above two approaches in one study. Almost all previous studies have chosen to compare these approaches using the Malmquist TFP index.
However, in Section 3 we show that the constant returns to scale assumption needed for the Malmquist index may be unrealistic when applied to the banking sector and that the use of the more flexible Hicks-Moorsteen index is more appropriate.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a short introduction to the Iranian banking industry. Section 3 includes an explanation on why we have adopted the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index instead of the popular Malmquist TFP index. It also presents a literature review of the previous studies that have considered research on productivity growth and the efficiency of Iranian banks. Section 4 concisely discusses the methodology used in the study. Section 5 explores the data utilized in the paper. Section 6 discusses our empirical results, followed by some concluding remarks in Section 7.
The Iranian banking industry
Until 1979, Iran's banking system was dominated by Western banking norms and practices.
However, following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, all foreign bank representative offices were closed. Consistent with Islamic banking practices, an interest-rate free banking law was ratified by Iran's parliament in 1983, which banned the charging of interest on all lending and borrowing activities. As the abolition of interest on bank deposits would make saving and term deposits unattractive, the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) also established an alternative system whereby depositors would receive a return depending on a bank's investment profitability at the end of a financial year. Instead of interest rates, the CBI introduced minimum investment returns (also referred to as "profit rates") that were applicable to term and saving deposits of varying maturities (Valadkhani, 2004 ). The banking industry has undergone substantial changes over the last decade caused by increased government regulation and technological advances, resulting in extensive restructuring. The Iranian government regulatory initiatives launched in 2005 can be regarded as the most influential change during this period, requiring all banks to reduce deposit and loan profit rates considerably. In addition, the government imposed preferential profit rates and conditions. For example, they required public banks to assign higher priority in their lending operations to areas such as low cost housing and small and medium enterprises (CBI, 2007a) . However, the ratio of public banks' non-performing loans (NPLs) to their total loans almost doubled immediately, from approximately 5 percent in 2005, to 10.4 and 9.7 percent in 2006 , respectively (CBI 2005 2007b) . As a result, one may argue that these changes in the profit rates and NPLs have negatively affected the banks' management success in controlling costs and generating revenues. Therefore, with such a significant regulatory upheaval in the banking industry, a study of Iranian banks' operating performance in both pre and post-reform is particularly pertinent and timely.
Literature review

Why the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index
To date the Malmquist index has been used as a dominant methodology to examine TFP growth within a multiple inputs and outputs framework. This approach has been applied in numerous industries and sectors such as agriculture, postal sector, airports, steel industry, as well as the financial and banking sector (see , inter alia, Mukherjee et al. 2001; Ma et al., 2002; Sturm and Williams 2004; Coelli and Rao 2005; Iturralde and Quirós, 2008; Babalos et al., 2012; Gitto and Mancuso, 2012) . With respect to the empirical literature specifically relating to banks, Fethi and Pasiouras (2010) demonstrate that almost all of the 196 studies analysing banking performance via the estimation of TFP growth employed a DEA-type Malmquist index, see for example Berg et al. (1992) , Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1997) , Gilbert and Wilson (1998) , Wheelock and Wilson (1999) , Worthington (1999) , Mukherjee et al. (2001) , Sathye (2002) The Malmquist productivity index was initially introduced by Caves et al. (1982) as a theoretical index. Färe et al. (1992) later merged Farrell's (1957) measurement of efficiency with the measurement of productivity developed by Caves et al. (1982) to develop a new Malmquist index of productivity changes. Färe et al. (1992) demonstrated that the resulting TFP indexes could be decomposed into technical and efficiency change components. Färe et al. (1994) subsequently decomposed the efficiency change further into pure technical efficiency change and change in scale efficiency, a development which ultimately resulted in the Malmquist index becoming the most widely popular empirical index of productivity changes. However, the constant returns to scale (CRS) technology assumption required for its estimation has received mixed responses in the literature. For example, Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1995) and Coelli and Rao (2005) are in favour of the CRS assumption and argue that the adoption of non-constant returns to scale in the Malmquist productivity index may lead to the inaccurate measurement of TFP gains or losses arising from scale economies. On the other hand, other studies such as Ray and Desli (1997) and Wheelock and Wilson (1999) argue that the decomposition of the CRS Malmquist index undertaken by Färe et al. (1994) may not be reliable. For instance, Wheelock and Wilson (1999) show that when a firm's location in the production possibility set has not changed (from one period to the next), and the change to scale efficiency is purely the result of a shift in the VRS estimate of technology, employing a CRS assumption would result in a zero technical change estimate. Under these circumstances they argue that the CRS estimate of technology is statistically inconsistent. In addition to these general concerns on the CRS assumption, many studies have found that such an assumption is not an appropriate choice for analysing banks' performance as they usually face factors such as imperfect competition and government regulations (see McAllister and McManus 1993; Mitchell and Onvural 1996; Clark 1996; Wheelock and Wilson 1997; Wheelock and Wilson 1999) .
O'Donnell (2012a) casts further doubt on the Malmquist productivity index as a TFP index and demonstrated that that the popular Malmquist TFP index of Caves et al. (1982) cannot be used to reliably measure TFP changes except in special cases. O'Donnell's argument is in line with the finding of a study by Kerstens et al. (2010) demonstrating that the Malmquist index is not always a TFP index. Kerstens et al. (2010) and Epure et al. (2011) point out that the distance functions constituting the Malmquist TFP index may well be undefined when estimated by general technologies 2 2 For more details on the issue of infeasibility of the distance functions, see Bjurek (1996) , Chung et al (1997) , Epure et al. (2011) , and Kenjegalieva and Simper (2011). . In contrast, Kerstens et al. (2010) , Epure et al. (2011) and O'Donnell (2012a) state that the lesser known Hicks-Moorsteen productivity index is well-defined under weak conditions on technology (weak assumptions of strong disposability and VRS) and thus more reliable than the Malmquist TFP index. For these reasons, following Epure et al. (2011) and Arjomandi et al. (2012) , this study employs the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index to analyse banks' performance without making any assumption concerning firm-optimizing behaviour, the structure of markets, or returns to scale. 
Literature review of Hicks-Moorsteen studies on banking productivity
As a result of the above shortcomings prevalent in the Malmquist index there has been an increasing interest in using Hicks-Moorsteen indices to measuring firms' productivity in different areas in recent years. Some important applications of this index include O'Donnell (2010a; 2012a; 2012b) and Hoang (2011) in the agricultural sector, Simões and Marques (2012) in the waste sector and Epure et al. (2011), Arjomandi et al. (2012) , and Arora and Arora (2012; 2013) in the context of the banking sector. Iranian public banks (6 commercial and 4 specialised banks) during the period 1997-1999, and found that the specialised banks were considerably more technically efficient than the commercial banks. Hasanzadeh (2007) also used the same standard intermediation model as that of Hadian and Hosseini (2004) to examine the technical efficiency of all the public and private banks in the period 1997-2003. The results of his study were consistent with those of Hadian and Hosseini (2004) . Hasanzadeh (2007) also found that the private banks were more technical efficient than the public banks, and pointed out that the government ownership had a substantial negative effect on the public banks' control of inputs and outputs. As discussed earlier, Arjomandi et al. (2012) Overall, in all previous studies, the profit-maximising role of the Iranian banks has been ignored. To fill this important gap in the literature, our study employs the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index to analyse both intermediation and operational performance of the banks during the pre and post-reform eras. In addition, this study provides various components of efficiency changes for each individual bank, which can be insightful for bank managers as well as policy makers.
Methodology
The Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index
The following standard definition of TFP is used in this 
. In addition, this index is the only multiplicatively-complete index that can be computed without requiring price data. The
Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index is defined as:
( 1) where
are output and input distance functions, respectively, and P T denotes the period-T production possibilities set in these functions.
5
4 In general, any TFP index that can be expressed as aggregate outputs and inputs is said to be multiplicativelycomplete; where completeness is an essential requirement for an economically meaningful decomposition of the TFP change.
We adopt the nonparametric DEA method used by O'Donnell (2010a; 2012a; 2012b) and Hoang (2011) Fig. 1 shows mapping of multiple-input and multiple-output production points onto an aggregate quantity space. The curve passing through point C denotes a mix-restricted frontier,
The components of TFP change
representing the boundary set of all technically feasible aggregate input-output combinations which hold the same input and output mix as the DMU operating at point A. DMU A can boost its TFP by expanding outputs and achieving point C. Thus, the vertical distance from point A to point C shows the measure of output-oriented technical efficiency (OTE), and can be defined as:
where t Y is the maximum aggregate output which is technically feasible when using t x to generate a scalar multiple of t y . Hence, TFP of the DMU, and the maximum TFP possible The curve passing through point V is the unrestricted production frontier, which is the boundary of the production possibilities set when all mix restrictions are relaxed. Now the DMU can expand its aggregate output and move vertically from point C to point V in Fig. 1 . In view of this, the mix efficiency measure can be defined as the difference between the TFP at a technically efficient point on the mix-restricted frontier and the TFP at a point on the unrestricted frontier. Hence, the pure output-oriented mix efficiency (OME) is a measure of the change in productivity when restrictions on the input and output mix of the DMU are relaxed. It can be defined as:
where ˆt Y is the maximum aggregate output which is feasible when using t x to produce any given output vector.
Obviously, any increase in technical and mix efficiency implies a rise in the TFP. However, when one moves from point A to point V the DMU becomes technically efficient and mix efficient, but its TFP is not maximized. In other words, the DMU's TFP will be maximized only by moving to the point E, where a straight line through the origin is tangential to the unrestricted 
This measure of TFP efficiency measures the proportionate increase in TFP as the DMU moves all the way from point A to point E. Fig. 1 
The first component in the brackets on the right-hand side of Equation (8) 
Intermediation approach vs. operating approach
The intermediation approach, first proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1977) focuses on various services as banks' output, with labor, capital, and various funding sources as inputs. This approach has been used in many studies such as Berger et al. (1987) , Aly et al. (1990 ), Hancock (1991 , Bauer et al. (1998) , Wheelock and Wilson (1999) , Burgess and Wilson (1995), Sathye (2001) , Neal (2004) , Sufian (2007) , and Maghyereh and Awartani (2012) . Following these studies, and consistent with Arjomandi et al. (2012) , this paper employs three inputs to produce three outputs. The inputs are labor 1 ( ) x , measured by the number of full-time equivalent employees on the payroll at the end of each period; physical capital 2 ( ) x , measured by the book value of premises and fixed assets; and purchased-fund input 3 ( ) x , which encompasses all time and savings deposits and other borrowed funds (excluding demand deposits). On the output side, production is represented by total demand deposits 1 ( ) y ; public sector loans 2 ( ) y , including loans and advances for government-owned enterprises; and private (non-public) loans 3 ( ) y , including conventional and Islamic loans for privately owned enterprises.
In comparison, the profit-oriented operating approach proposed by Drake et al. (2006) All the data utilised in this paper were obtained from Iran's Central Bank archives (CBI 2005; . We considered all but three banks operating in the Iranian banking system, as these three
were not homogeneous in terms of their input and output mixes. We used a balanced panel data covering 14 banks over a six-year period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . As stated earlier this time period was selected to encompass both the pre and post-reform eras, and the coverage of our dataset is similar to that of Arjomandi et al. (2012) . Due to the data availability and definitional problems, an expansion of this sample was not feasible. The full list of our 14 sample banks is shown in Table 1 . Finally, all estimated indexes were obtained by using the DPIN software programme (O'Donnell, 2010b).
Empirical results
As discussed earlier, Arjomandi et al. (2012) have examined the productivity and efficiency changes among the Iranian banks using the intermediation approach. However, the use of this approach may not necessarily capture the different goals pursued by private and public banks.
Therefore, in this section we supplement the results of the intermediation approach (Arjomandi et al., 2012) with the results of operating approach to gain an in-depth understanding of productivity and efficiency changes from different angles. In addition, we provide various efficiency measures for individual banks to assist relevant decision makers in their assessment of the performance of private and public banking practices. Pure technical efficiency (OTE), scale efficiency (OSE) and mix efficiency (OME) for individual banks are presented using both the intermediation and operating approaches for commercial, specialised and private banks in three selected years (2004, 2006, and 2008) in Table 1 .
6 Table 1 The interpretation is as follows. A technical efficiency estimate equal to one indicates that the corresponding bank is located on the boundary of the production set, and thus is (relatively) efficient. An estimate below unity means that the bank is located under the frontier and hence it is technically inefficient. A DMU that has technical efficiency equal to 1 but displays scale and mix efficiency less than 1 is still on the frontier, but at a relatively unproductive point. rather than maximizing their revenue. However, this was not the case for all public banks. Of note is that the Bank Saderat was fully technical efficient under the operating approach in all years, however, its efficiency declined over time under the intermediation approach. In general, commercial banks decreased their technical efficiency in 2008 under both approaches. In contrast, private banks largely maintained their technical efficiency levels, particularly in terms of maximising revenue under the operating approach.
In relation to banks' scale efficiency, Table 1 shows that scale inefficiency is a main source of all banks' overall inefficiency under the intermediation approach, in particular the public banks in the post-reform era (e.g. Bank Saderat, Bank Sepah and Housing Bank). This point will be analysed more thoroughly in the following tables.
With regards to the mix efficiency estimates, all of the private banks were fully mix and technically efficient under the operating approach in the selected years (with the only exception being Bank Eghtesad Novin in 2006). Not surprisingly, this finding suggests that almost all private banks enjoyed higher productivity in terms of achieving income-based objectives.
However, this has not been achievable for public banks, as they are obliged to strictly follow the government's preferential credit policies in certain areas. For example, Table 1 shows that under the intermediation approach, the Housing Bank is the most mix inefficient in the three selected years, presumably because it is heavily influenced by government policies and priorities in terms of providing housing facilities to low-income groups. Table 2 provides a summary of estimated pure, scale and mix efficiency levels of aggregate groupings of individual banks during the period 2003-2008. The results reveal that under the intermediation approach, the average pure technical efficiency (OTE) of the public banks is relatively higher in the post-regulation era (2006) (2007) (2008) . However, the OTE for private banks shows a large decline over the same period. These changes coincided with major banking reforms initiated in 2005. Due to these government initiatives, public banks were obliged to provide more direct credit facilities, grant lower profit rates and subsidized-banking services to several less-privileged areas. It may be argued that due to this large expansion in public banks' advances to the less-developed regions, public banks became more purely efficient than private banks in terms of the provision of loans. On the other hand, the significantly lower pure efficiency of private banks after 2005 can also be attributed to their poor management of deposits. Put otherwise, because the profit rates given to deposits by private banks were higher than those of public banks, they attracted large deposits, but they initially could not utilize them efficiently in investment projects (CBI 2007a). 7 In contrast, Table 2 also reveals that under the intermediation approach, public banks on average became highly scale and mix inefficient after the 2005 reforms. In general, average scale efficiency estimates of the commercial and specialised banks were quite low, varying below 94 percent and 84 percent respectively, in the post-regulation era. These suboptimal levels of scale efficiency and mix efficiency can be attributed to the lack of independence public banks have from the government in relation to management of their inputs-outputs.
Under the operating approach, our technical and mix efficiency results are unambiguously in contrast to those of Arjomandi et al (2012) , thus highlighting the need to analyse performance and efficiency from multiple perspectives. Our operating efficiency estimates in Table 2 reveal that private banks were fully technically efficient every year during the sample period, with the only exception being 2006. The results also indicate that private banks were generally the most efficient banks in terms of the allocation of inputs and outputs (mix efficiency). At least two reasons are behind the relatively poor performance of the public banks: 1) public banks focus more on creating employment opportunities in rural areas and among people with low skills; and 2) by providing artificially low profit rates, public banks are also obliged to follow the government policy objectives of advancing a relatively large quantity of loans to regions considered as high priorities. In general, Table 3 shows that the banking industry experienced improvements in terms of By looking at the upper section of Table 3 in 2004-2005, 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 , the industry's estimates of ∆Tech were greater than unity, suggesting that an overall technological progress in the industry is apparent. However, from a profit-oriented perspective (the lower part of Table 3 
Conclusions
In the present study we analysed both intermediation and operational performance of Iranian banks by means of a DEA-based decomposition of the Hicks-Moorsteen TFP index. We estimated various efficiency measures and components of productivity changes of the banking industry over the period 2003-2008 using the operating (profit-oriented) approach, and compared our findings with those of Arjomandi et al. (2012) , which were based solely on the intermediation approach.
Firstly, comparing public and private banks, it is shown that public banks' pure technical efficiency tended to be higher than that of private banks after the imposition of regulatory reforms in 2005 using the intermediation approach. This is likely because: 1) public banks were mandated by government regulations to increase loans to various groups, defined in this approach as output, and were therefore more likely to be measured as relatively efficient; 2) private banks, could not manage their inputs (deposits) efficiently which increased markedly due to the profit rate differentials between public and private banks. However, under the profitoriented operating approach, private banks were found to be relatively highly technically and mix efficient during the entire sample period. This is a major contribution to the literature from this paper as it highlights the need to analyse banks from both a service and revenue performance perspective. Private banks in Iran can independently pursue revenue maximization in their allocation of resources. However, it appears that the achievement of regulatory goals for public banks to increase lending, which increased their efficiency under the intermediation approach, was to the detriment of their performance under this revenue based approach.
We did not find any individual bank as the best performer using both approaches and estimates of efficiency, again suggesting that it is difficult to achieve efficiency in the provision of services and also be relatively profitable within the new regulatory framework. In general, our findings indicate that, irrespective of which approach is considered, the industry experienced Scale inefficiency is one of the most pressing reasons for the industry's overall inefficiency during the post-regulation period (under both approaches). We may attribute this to the lack of financial institution independence and the regulatory interventions that adversely affected the way inputs and outputs were managed in the banking system. However, since the market is noncompetitive and the public banks must follow government policies, the poor scale efficiency results may not be solely interpreted as inefficiency and performance mismanagement of individual public banks. Under current regulatory circumstances, they have no choice other than implementing the normative policies imposed by the government and the Central Bank in the interests of equity and fairness. If revenue maximizing was to be of paramount importance, we may conclude that the independence of the central bank and limited government regulatory power in the banking industry could boost the efficiency and productivity of the banking system.
